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THE USE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION IN
SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCEDURES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report presents the findings of an exploratory study
designed to determine if existing financial reporting sources can
be used to evaluate the financial health and behavior of indivi-
duals in critical management positions. There are at least two
dimensions to the financial health and behavior issue. The first
is the identification of individuals who are receiving funds for
illegal or unethical activities. Given that individuals acquire
resource bases that exceed normal expectations, can we use current
accounting and financial reporting sources to identify such
individuals? The report discusses the use of such traditional
methods as using information available from personal credit reports
for the identification of individuals who are in categories known
as "superpayers" . The other dimension of the issue is that finan-
cial difficulties may be an indicator of susceptibility to commit-
ting illegal or unethical acts to meet financial obligations. The
report also discusses the use of the financial data for predicting
financial difficulties.
Though traditional sources can be used to evaluate the
financial health and behavior of individuals, evidence indicates
that legitimate and illegitimate resources are not necessarily or
ordinarily identified by normal financial reporting mechanisms.
Therefore, a second level analysis was initiated to ask the
question of how to identify resources, primarily cash, that would
not be reported through normal financial reporting mechanisms
(e.g., unlisted bank accounts, cash purchases) . Methods that could
be used to investigate or identify the orderly disposal of large
amounts of cash were explored.
Results indicate that available data sources to track such
expenditures are limited. However, in some cases surrogate
measures may be useful. Currently, additional work is being done
by others in the use of artificial intelligence and statistical
modeling to identify individuals who are or represent risks as
identified by their reported financial information.

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report is to discuss the results of an
exploratory study of the use of currently available financial data
to improve the screening of individuals for positions of trust.
This includes individuals who are in a position to make policy
decisions, those whose employment requires access to classified
information and those entrusted with the financial resources of an
organization. The approach taken was to identify commercially
available databases that could identify the use of financial
resources by individuals.
Methods currently in use to assess suitability for security
clearances, such as background checks into the personal lives of
applicants, appear to be at least partially effective. None of the
recent widely publicized cases of espionage and fraud has had
blackmail, political sympathies and other issues of character alone
as a motivator. We do know, however, that in almost every recent
case of the unauthorized disclosure of government information and
other illegal behavior, money has been an incentive for the
individuals involved (Betts, 1988) . For instance, Frank Coccia,
a former top civilian official in the Defense Personnel Support
Center's clothing and textile directorate, is scheduled to be
sentenced after pleading guilty to racketeering charges. Mr.
Coccia accepted bribes from textile and clothing companies seeking
government contracts and hid the proceeds in his home. Mr. Coccia
used a civilian consultant who was a former Defense Department
employee as his "bagman". The civilian consultant collected the
bribe money from military clothing companies and laundered it by
exchanging the cash for money orders and gold coins. The associate
then delivered the bribes to Mr. Coccia and other Defense Depart-
ment officials. Prosecutors say they can prove that Mr. Coccia
accepted at least $330,000 in bribes. A total of $440,000 has been
seized from Mr. Coccia by federal investigators (Pound, 1988) .
An assessment of the financial profiles of individuals appears
to be an area where gains could be made in improving screening
processes. For instance, in the well-publicized Walker and
Whitworth cases, vital military communications information was sold
over a period years for financial gain. The original impetus was
financial difficulties experienced by Walker (Barron, 1987) . In
the Pollard case, information was passed to another government,
which Pollard said had a right to the information. However,
Pollard was also paid about $45,000 for his efforts (Marcus, 1985) .
It has been hypothesized that better financial screening would have
identified these individuals as possible risks, and that further
investigation prompted by the financial screens would have stopped




The approach adopted for the analysis of the financial profile
of individuals can be viewed as a series of screens going from
coarse to fine. Each layer of the screen attempts to filter more
refined and less obvious financial indicators. Four avenues were
explored to attempt to identify information that could be used for
screening purposes: credit reports, banks, list brokerage informa-
tion and airline travel information. We considered the effective-
ness of the screens on individuals in two different financial
situations: those with financial difficulties and those with
unexplained financial resources. For the individuals with finan-
cial difficulty, the emphasis was on seeking means both to identify
individuals who are financially overextended and to predict
financial difficulty. For those individuals with unexplained
financial resources, we also considered level of sophistication in
handling financial resources and income level. Those individuals
who are unsophisticated concerning financial matters could be
expected to behave in ways which would be readily observable
through existing financial reporting sources. An individual with
a salary of $20,000 per year who has a high line of credit and
takes frequent, expensive vacations would be an example of such
behavior. Such cases should be easily detectable using current and
rather coarse screening procedures. It would be more difficult to
detect illicit financial activity involving individuals with a
higher degree of financial sophistication. These individuals could
be expected to behave in ways that would not be as readily observ-
able. Also, an individual's level of income will influence the
ability to identify excess resources. That is, the increase in
discretionary income when one moves from $20,000 a year to $50,000
a year makes the task of identifying individuals who are living
beyond their means more difficult.
CREDIT REPORTS
Currently, credit reports are one of the primary method used
by commercial firms and governmental agencies to assess an indi-
vidual's financial stability (Chandler and Coffman, 1979). Credit
reports contain financial and public record information concerning
the subject of the report. This information includes demographic
information such as name, home address, social security number,
employer and age. Each credit account listed on the credit report
generally includes account number, monthly payment patterns,
subscriber code, date reported, date opened, limit, balance, amount
past due, type of account and account status. Information obtained
from public records, such as liens, bankruptcy, and legal suits is
also included. The information received from credit reports will
be complete only if the subject of the investigation has provided
all former addresses and aliases or the credit history identifies
the addresses and aliases. For any single credit reporting service
depth of coverage for a given locale varies (i.e., although a
credit reporting service covers a geographic area, another service
may have a better reporting system for that particular area in that
more of the local firms use and report to one credit agency as
opposed to the other) . As a result, if a former address is not
provided and local coverage by the chosen credit reporting service
is not thorough, it is possible that a period of poor financial
performance will be missed entirely by investigators. Of course,
if a thirty-five year old applicant is investigated and shows no
record of previous credit, this should cue investigators to
initiate a more thorough investigation. However, a twenty-two year
old with no previous credit history is more understandable. Also,
until recently, east and west coast credit reporting systems were
not fully connected and many credit reporting systems were not
necessarily connected between states.
In addition to identifying individuals who could pose a risk
because of financial difficulties, the credit report can be used
to identify individuals with unexplained financial resources who
are known as "superpayers" . "Superpayers" are individuals who
support higher levels of credit at greater levels of currency than
could normally be expected at their income level. These indi-
viduals are of interest because the unexplained affluence could
indicate resources obtained by illegitimate means. On the other
hand, the unexplained affluence could be the result of something
as simple as an inheritance.
Major drawbacks in using credit reports to financially screen
candidates and current employees for positions of trust include:
The reports are complex and time-consuming to analyze. There is
no standardized reporting format for the various credit services.
Relevant data may be missing. In addition, if the analysis is done
manually the reliability of the analysis of the report depends on
the skill of the individual evaluator. Technigues have been
developed to overcome some of these problems. These evaluation
technigues were developed for credit granting institutions (Makow-
ski, 1985) . Two such technigues, automated credit scoring and
expert systems, are discussed below.
CREDIT EVALUATION
Credit evaluation or scoring is used to rate credit reports
and credit applications. Manual or automated methods can be used.
Manual methods can be judgmental, such as a loan officer reviewing
a credit application, or incorporate the application of such
techniques as decision trees (Chandler and Coffman, 1979)
.
Automated credit evaluation includes the use of techniques such as
discriminant analysis, which is discussed in the next section.
Automated Credit Report Analysis
The use of discriminant analysis for credit scoring requires
a historical database. Discriminant analysis programs are usually
constructed using credit performance data obtained from the user's
experience with the pool of individuals to whom the user has
granted credit. The database may contain information not found on
the credit report but requested by the credit granting institution
(Harter, 1974) . While these systems may be well-suited for use by
financial institutions granting credit, the need for a historical
base restricts their use in background investigations. The number
of individuals identified as perpetrators of illegal or unethical
activities through use of a position of trust is small. The U.S.
Government has arrested only 63 people for espionage since the late
1970 's (Wallcott, 1987). Information on individuals in the private
sector who commit unethical or illegal acts for financial gain
appears to be under-reported (Dee, 1985; Loomis, 1985; Metzenbaum,
1986; Willis, 1986). At best, the use of discriminant analysis in
background investigations could only be based on the judgmental
analysis of "good" and "bad" risks as defined by experts.
The Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center
(PERSEREC) contacted the Fair, Isaac Companies to discuss the
feasibility of the use of automated systems for the financial
portion of the security clearance process. Fair, Isaac pioneered
the development of automated financial analysis systems for the
financial community (Makowski, 1985) and has experience working
with another government agency, the Internal Revenue Service.
Fair, Isaac eventually submitted a proposal to the Defense Inves-
tigative Service (DIS) for the development of a Custom Automated
Strategic Application Processing System (ASAP). Fair, Isaac's
proposal points out the similarities of the needs of and processes
used to arrive at "good risk/bad risk" decisions between DIS and
the financial community. The benefits Fair, Isaac expects DIS to
accrue should it choose to implement the proposed ASAP System are
very similar to the benefits of expert systems to the financial
community enumerated by Ben-David and Sterling (198 6) . These
expected benefits include faster processing of the credit report
portion of the investigation, the need for fewer personnel due to
paperwork reduction, and increased ability by management to track
performance and refine investigative parameters.
Little empirical data are presently available on which to base
investigative parameters. Fair, Isaac claims that the database
and management reports generated by ASAP could provide management
and investigators with the information needed to adjust investiga-
tive strategies for maximum effectiveness. The federal government
has a longstanding interest in the cost effectiveness of investiga-
tive procedures (ODASD & OASD, 1970; Department od Defense, 1974;
Defense Investigative Service, 1981) . The ASAP may provide data
in the form of management reports that will support divergent and
more cost effective investigative techniques for different categor-
ies of security clearance applicants. For instance, the data might
reveal that credit checks pertaining to addresses more than five
years old rarely yield information relevant to investigations on
civilian contractors. These sports would give management the data
to support shortening the investigated time period. On the other
hand, the reports might show that credit checks covering the past
ten years often contain relevant information. These data would
then support the decision to retain the data for the ten year
period. In addition to providing data to manage investigative
parameters, the data would lend support to resource allocation
requests in the agency budgeting process.
Expert Systems
Expert systems are being to be applied to the area of credit
analysis (Sivasankaran and Salazar, 1988) . Expert systems hold the
promise of eliminating many of the drawbacks associated with the
manual analysis of credit reports (Sivasankaran and Bui, 1987)
.
The potential benefits to be gained from such systems can in many
cases be applied to the financial portion of background inves-
tigations. According to Ben-David and Sterling (1986) benefits to
financial institutions include:
Identification of potential threats among present debtor
customers when the system is used in conjunction with
existing databases.
- A better decision making process when a human expert has
a good expert system.
Better results by using both rules of thumb and "conven-
tional 11 bad debt analysis.
- Time spent on trivial and straightforward cases can be
lessened.
The expert system offers the ability to model the expert's logic
and identify patterns that are significant from the expert's
perspective. When expert systems are applied to the financial
portion of background investigations, these systems have the
potential to reduce the personnel resources needed, streamline the
processing and eliminate backlogs for financial screening of
individuals in positions of trust. Expert systems can complete
the initial screening of the reports. Human experts can spend
their time analyzing difficult cases rather than screening routine
cases. By simple keyboard inputs to the system, managers can
choose and adjust criteria for flagging cases as new investigative
criteria and parameters are developed. The time from the origina-
tion of a background investigation to completion could be reduced
because of the automation of the process. In addition, the use of
expert systems can reduce the cost of credit report analysis to a
level which allows for more frequent follow-up and the establish-
ment of financial trends for an individual (Ben-David and Sterling,
1986)
.
Identifying additional meaningful data to better screen in-
dividuals for positions of trust remains an issue with an automated
screening system or expert system. It must be remembered that the
construction of an expert system requires an expert. The effec-
tiveness of the expert system is limited by the fact that it is
based on knowledge gained through interviewing an individual or in-
dividuals with a proven performance record in the area (Buchanan
et al., 1983). Analysis of "good" and "bad" risks depends on the
knowledge and biases of these individuals. While an expert system
may increase efficiency in terms of processing reports and resource
allocation, "built-in" errors may affect the performance of the
system. Errors in "good" versus "bad" risk judgments are possible
because of the policies applied by the agencies involved in
adjudicating background investigations as well as biases due to the
system's programming. While different inquiries and investigative
parameters may be found to be more efficient for different categor-
ies of investigations (such as active duty officers versus civilian
contractors) , data which can be used by management to increase ef-
ficiency does not necessarily mean increased effectiveness in
screening out security risks. "Bad risk" detection failure rates
are not as easily determined in the personnel security field as in
the financial arena. Determining failure rates cannot be ac-
complished by simply assessing the currency of accounts. It is
virtually impossible to know when the screening mechanisms have
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failed except when an individual is caught in illegal or unethical
acts.
Credit Report Acquisition
The acquisition of the credit reports for analysis can also
be either a manual or automated process. Programs are available
which automatically choose the credit reporting service with the
best coverage for a particular geographic area using addresses
keyed in by system operators or transmitted by facsimile (Nelson,
1979; Slater, 1979). The ASAP System proposed by Fair, Isaac for
DIS contains this feature. The ASAP will also monitor level of
performance by credit reporting bureaus in a given area and allow
management to choose which bureau will be queried. This will help
ensure the use of the bureau with the "richest" financial data for
a given area. Use of the best credit information available has
the potential to increase the quality of the final credit report
on individuals. The ASAP System is designed to order appropriate
reports and generate manual requests for credit information when
needed. The automatic procurement of credit reports could further
reduce personnel costs and expedite the process of financial
screening.
BANKS
Banks and other financial institutions, such as Savings and
Loans and Credit Unions, are of interest for two reasons. The
first is that banks are credit granting institutions and the
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logical place for depositing excess funds. The second is that
banks must report to the government information concerning deposi-
tors. The Bank Secrecy Act requires financial institutions to
report deposits and withdrawals in excess of $10,000 or a series
of deposits or withdrawals in excess of $10,000 which could be
construed as a single transaction (Journal of Accountancy , March
1986) . The intent of the law is to restrict the ability of
individuals involved in illegal activities to move and launder
money (Journal of Accountancy , January 1986) . If an individual is
depositing illicitly obtained funds, records would be available to
investigators. Under the provisions of The Right to Financial
Privacy Act, federal investigators can obtain the records with an
administrative summons, subpoena, search warrant, a judicial
subpoena or written customer authorization (McDonough, 1987)
.
Hiring agencies could conceivably require a written release for
obtaining such information as a precondition to employment. Some
individuals attempting to conceal funds might be caught in this
screen. However, it is unlikely that an individual knowledgeable
in financial matters would deposit or withdraw large sums of money
and run the risk of exposure. Banks are also required to report
interest paid on accounts to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
(Journal of Accountancy , January 1986) . The knowledgeable in-
dividual also would not place the funds in an interest-bearing
account which would be reported to the IRS. However, even if the
information were reported, IRS policy and the Right to Financial
Privacy Act severely restrict access to the information (Dwyer,
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1985) . It is more likely that such an individual would deposit
money in a non-interest-bearing account in small increments which
would then not be reported to either law enforcement agencies or
the IRS. If credit is not requested at the financial institution
where the non-interest-bearing account is located, the existence
of the account would not be reported to credit reporting services.
Given that checks are cleared by the Federal Reserve Banks using
only bank identification numbers, individual checking accounts
could be maintained and used by an individual without the funds
ever being identified with that individual's credit history
(Bizzle, 1988) . Though the individual could be required to sign
a release which would relieve the restrictions of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act and allow employers access to bank records,
finding such accounts would still be difficult.
EXPLORATION OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL INDICATORS
Since it is possible for an individual to conceal excess
resources, alternative means to conduct financial screening were
explored. Two areas which were considered to have potential as
screens were the use of list brokers and airline records.
LIST BROKERS
List brokers are of interest because individuals who success-
fully conceal funds in financial institutions might spend cash or
use unreported checking accounts to purchase luxury items. These
luxury items could provide a means to dispose of the funds in a way
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that is not obvious to the casual observer. For example, if one
buys high quality clothing those who see the individual may think
the person dresses well, but will not necessarily know how much
money was spent on the attire. Another example would be expensive
wine for home consumption. It is unlikely that others would notice
that the wine an individual regularly drinks with dinner costs $50
or $150 a bottle. Even if it were noted that the individual drank
wine, the general population and most investigators would probably
not be aware of the value of a particular wine.
If the individual always made cash purchases and never allowed
the purchased items to be delivered, it would be extremely dif-
ficult to identify that individual. If, on the other hand, catalog
purchases were made or the individual allowed home delivery of the
purchased items, the individual could end up on the mailing lists
of "upscale" stores (e.g. , Nieman-Marcus, Saks, Gumps, and Berg-
dorf-Goodman) . One method to identify these individuals would be
to cross-check the mailing lists for individuals with high units
of sale from these stores. If the sales of luxury items were
determined to be at a higher level than could normally be supported
on the individual's salary, it could indicate the individual has
unexplained excess resources or is overextended financially.
Though identifying individuals through the cross-checking of
such mailing lists may be possible, it does not appear to be
practical. Retailing firms organize their databases by such
categories as geographic area, zip code, sex and by average units
of sale (maximum category generally in the range of $100) for the
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last three, six of twelve months (AETNA, 1988) . It would be
extremely difficult to use the lists as a screening mechanism as
only small purchases would be required to surpass a $100 cutoff for
average unit of sale. Also a number of relatively small purchases
could result in an individual's name being included on all the
lists in question at any given time. Interestingly, the list
brokers do offer names of individuals categorized by occupation
such as government contractors, laboratory executives, plant
managers, plant supervisors, computer scientists and engineers, and
foreign operation executives. The names of firms with overseas
plants and export and import companies are also available to anyone
willing to pay the fee. These lists coupled with credit reports
could be an invaluable resource for those recruiting individuals
to commit illegal or unethical acts (Betts, 1988)
.
AIRLINE TRAVEL
Another area examined as a possible avenue of identifying the
orderly disposal of cash assets was airline travel. Tracking of
airline travel could possibly be used as an indicator that addi-
tional investigation is warranted. Airline travel could be
important for two reasons. One is that given an individual has
excess funds, one way to protect the funds from detection is to
deposit the funds in an off-shore bank. The second is to dispose
of funds by spending the money for recreational travel.
Airlines account for tickets by ticket numbers and not by the
names or other identifying information of the passengers, making
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the tracking of airline travel difficult (Palumbo, 1988; Tsotsoros,
1988) . Other information on the individual such as the date of
travel or the city from which the flight originated is needed so
that passenger lists can be examined for the name of the indivi-
dual. Manual accounting and backtracking is involved in matching
ticket numbers to individuals. The manual checks necessary for
tracking airline travel render the process too expensive and time-
consuming to be used as a routine check. Reservation records are
kept on microfiche, but no mechanism is in place which would easily
allow for the screening of these records. Since the airlines do
not require positive identification unless the ticket is purchased
by check or overseas travel is involved, there is no way to be sure
the name on the ticket corresponds to the actual traveler even
after a name check is conducted. 1 If overseas travel is involved,
then the name on the ticket must correspond to the name on the
passport. However, federal law enforcement sources indicated that
even for federal investigations, passport checks to monitor
overseas travel would not be feasible as once the passport or visa
is issued, the Department of State does not keep records of travel
on individual passports. A manual inspection of the passport would
be necessary to determine what foreign traveling an individual had
done. (Palumbo, 1988) Regardless, countries such as Canada, Mexico
and some Caribbean islands do not require U. S. citizens to have
1 Such information is not difficult to obtain. Calls to an
800 airline reservation number and a local travel agency generated
a complete description of the process by which one could travel
without providing identification.
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passports and a resourceful individual could possibly find a source
for a false passport if one were needed.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Existing laws such as The Right to Financial Privacy Act
restrict access to the records of banks and other financial
institutions and limit their usefulness in financial screening
procedures. Obtaining information from these sources requires
investments in personnel time and expenses which limit their use
as a routine screening mechanism for large numbers of individuals.
(McDonough, 1987) . In addition, IRS policy strictly limits access
to its information on individuals. Airline travel information is
held in forms unsuitable for rapid screening (Tsotsoros, 1988)
.
The purpose of the airline systems is, after all, economical
accounting for airline travel, not monitoring individual travel.
At the present time, credit analysis and credit scoring aided
by computer technology show the most promise for improving back-
ground screening through the use of publicly available financial
data. The use of automated systems to analyze financial health
could help officials screen applicants for positions of trust.
Most white-collar crime is committed by long-term, trusted employ-
ees who develop financial difficulties or "wheeler-dealers" with
a lifestyle well beyond their actual financial means (Wells, 1985)
Assuming that illegal or unethical acts are the result of financial
difficulties, monitoring an individual's financial health over time
could reveal unfavorable trends. If financial screening indicates
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developing financial problems, preventative action could be taken
in time to limit the damage to the organization concerned.
Periodic financial screening would also alert organizations to the
fact that an employee may be in the act of compromising the
organization by uncovering "superpayers" and those with unexplained
excess funds. Monitoring financial information could foster
greater care in personal financial management or in the opposite
vein, greater care in shielding questionable financial activities.
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